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Abstract The question this paper is concerned with is: what if Immanuel Kant 
found a solution to the problem of the dualism of practical reason before Henry 
Sidgwick even came to formulate it? A comparison of Sidgwick’s and Kant’s 
approach to the problem of the dualism of practical reason is presented only in 
general terms, but the author concludes that this is sufficient for grasping the 
advantage of Kant’s solution to the problem. 
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An amusing and persistent anecdote that had followed Henry Sidgwick 
for decades – namely, that he is the most famous philosopher that no one 
has ever heard of – cannot really be associated with his name any more.1 
To become aware of this one needs only to take a look at the monographs 
written in the past several years about or inspired by his ethics.2 Surely, in 
professional academic circles Sidgwick’s book The Methods of Ethics (1981 
[1907]) has been acknowledged since it’s first edition (1874) as one of 
the most important achievements in the history of ethics, as a classic work 
– and it’s still recognized as such.3 However, even those who proclaim the 
book to be an unsurpassable study in philosophical ethics admit that it is 
sometimes dull (Parfit 2011: xxxiii), written in the style of a complicated, 
technical treatise (Singer 2000: xiv). Hence it shouldn’t come as a surprise 
that it was mostly experts in philosophical ethics who took on the task of 
studying this undoubtedly important and difficult book and that it couldn’t 
engage the interest of philosophers with different philosophical orienta-
tions,4 let alone a broader audience. 
1  This paper was written as part of project no. 179049 funded by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
2  See: Schultz (2004), Nakano-Okuno (2011), Philips (2011), Parfit (2011), Lazari-
Radek and Singer (2014), Hurka (2014), Crisp (2015).
3  Cf. Broad (1930:143), Parfit (2011: xxxiii).
4  After reading the book Alfred North Whitehead was even deterred from engaging 
in ethics at all (Harrod 1951: 76). On the other hand, some moral philosophers glad-
ly acknowledge Sidgwick as the “philosopher’s philosopher” (Singer 2000: xiv).
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Regardless, all experts and interpreters of Sidgwick’s ethics agree on one 
thing: namely, that he formulated a fundamental problem of practical phi-
losophy5 that, by his own admission, he didn’t succeed in solving, and 
which has apparently remained unsolved within his own, in the broader 
sense, consequentialist theory. This problem – known as the “dualism of 
practical reason” – represents Sidgwick’s genuine legacy: just about all of 
his successors have tried to come up with a rational solution (that is, with 
a justification of the rational insolubility) to the problem, or, if they are 
his critics, to declare it a badly formulated problem that as such should be 
dismissed. However, our intention here isn’t to assess the cogency of all 
of the offered suggestions, since that requires their comparison and, quite 
certainly, a lot more space. Likewise, given the limited number of pages 
we won’t go into detail about Sidgwick’s complex theory of dualism. Still, 
there is one comparison we don’t wish to avoid: the one between Sidg-
wick’s and the so-called Kantian approach to the problem of the dualism 
of practical reason.6 The comparison shall, of course, be quite simplified, 
at the risk of leaving out some important details, whose elaboration re-
quires a larger study.
But before we make a closer comparison of these two approaches it seems 
appropriate to ask the question: to what extent did Sidgwick engage with 
Kant’s ethics? Marcus Singer (Singer 2000: xlii) noted that Sidwick – al-
though an author of several essays on Kant’s metaphysics, epistemology 
and philosophy of mathematics – had barely and, so to speak, incidentally 
written about Kant’s ethics.7 We tend to agree with Singer’s remark that 
Sidgwick’s lack of a more adequate engagement with Kant’s ethics may re-
veal the most serious deficiencies of his own approach (Singer 2000: xlii). 
In other words, what if Kant, in his own distinct manner, had solved the 
problem of the dualism of practical reason before Sidgwick, in his own dis-
tinct manner, even came to formulate it?
5  Although Sidgwick would, following Joseph Butler, rather say that he reformulat-
ed it: “Butler’s express statement of the duality of the regulative principles in human 
nature constitutes an important step in ethical speculation; since it brings into clear 
view the most fundamental difference between the ethical thought of modern England 
and that of the old Greco-Roman world... [i]n Platonism and Stoicism, and in Greek 
moral philosophy generally, but one regulative and governing faculty is recognised 
under the name of Reason – however the regulation of Reason may be understood; in 
the modern ethical view, when it has worked itself clear, there are found to be two, – 
Universal Reason and Egoistic Reason, or Conscience and Self-Love” (Sidgwick 1931 
[1886]: 197-198).
6  We assume that Kant, like Sidgwick, could have been familiar with Butler’s con-
ception of the “duality of the regulative principles” (see footnote 4).
7  A few pages in the Outlines of the History of Ethics (Sidgwick 1931 [1886]: 271-
278) and an essay about Kant’s understanding of the freedom of the will, which was 
later reprinted as an appendix in The Methods of Ethics. 
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The phrase “dualism of practical reason” appears three times in The Meth-
ods of Ethics (1981 [1907]: xii (preface to the second edition), xxi (preface 
to the sixth edition) and 404, n. 1). However, the whole closing chapter 
of the book is dedicated to the nature of the problem, which Sidgwich un-
derstands as “the most profound problem of ethics” (1981 [1907]): 386, 
n. 4). In an important article “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies” 
(Sidgwick 2000 [1889]: 43) this problem is alternatively named “the du-
alism of rational or governing principles”. To put it briefly, Sidgwick is 
worried, to a level of gloominess and pessimism (cf. Mackie 1992), about 
the possibility of an irreconcilable conflict of moral normativity and the 
normativity of prudence. Regarding the two equally rational and ultimate 
ends of our practical reason, according to Sidwick – our own good and uni-
versal good8 – this conflict is presented in three forms: between interest 
and duty, between personal and general happiness, and between the two 
methods of ethics (utilitarianism and egoism, i.e. impartial reasoning and 
rational egoism). Sidwick’s pessimism consists in his belief that one can’t 
always expect success when it comes to solving a possible conflict between 
the concern for our own good and the concern for universal good.9 Since 
practical reason has at its disposal two equally justifiable rational and ul-
timate ends, which may at times lead to a suspension of decision-making, 
it cannot as such rely on its own capacities “to frame a perfect ideal of ra-
tional conduct” (Sidgwick 1874: 473). Because of its inherent inability or 
lack of capacity, it’s as if practical reason evokes some kind of an external 
impartial instance (God), the only thing which could provide a congruence 
of that what we ought to do on the grounds of prudence and that what we 
ought to do on moral grounds. Even if the separate demands of morality 
and prudence often coincide in our experience, the unprovability of the ex-
istence of a just warrantor of their congruence is proof of it’s contingency 
and incompleteness (cf. Sidgwick 1981 [1907]): 506-509; McLeod 2000: 
276; Orsi 2008: 19), which means that practical reason can sometimes 
prescribe mutually exclusive courses of action.
8  “The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of 
self-sacrifice” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: xx); “It is... reasonable for an individual to make 
an ultimate sacrifice of his happiness for the sake of the greater happiness of others, 
as well as reasonable for him to take his own happiness as ultimate end... [T]he ful-
filment of Duty [is] ultimately reasonable for the individual no less than the pursuit 
of self-interest” (Sidgwick 2000 [1889]: 45-46); cf. Parfit 2016: 169-170.
9  Exactly the opposite – the only thing we can expect, given the equal strength of 
the demands of morality and the demands of prudence, is inevitable failure – those are 
the words in which Sidgwick ends the first edition of The Methods of Ethics (Sidgwick 
1874: 473).
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There are three dominant ways of understanding the relationship between 
the realm of morality and the realm of prudence in the history of ethics: 10
1.  between these two equally valid normative realms there exists a har-
monic or collaborative relationship – didn’t Plato and Aristotle repeat-
edly say that to live morally is to live according to our own interests, 
i.e. in accordance with rationality?; this understanding is certainly in 
line with Joseph Butler and Thomas Hobbes, as well as contemporary 
Hobbesians such as David Gauthier and Gregory Kavka; what the de-
fenders of this understanding have in common is the opinion that a 
reconciliation is achievable in case of a possible conflict between the 
two normative realms;
2.  considering the initially equal rational power of our own demands, in 
case of a conflict between the two normative realms there is  rather a 
disharmonic relationship; this “dualism of practical reason” demon-
strates how impotent the practical reason is when it comes to solv-
ing the conflict, which ultimately leads to the “triumph of skepticism” 
(Sidgwick 1874: 472) regarding the “rational authority of morality” 
(cf. Brink 1992: 203-204); since prudential and moral reasons can be 
compared in terms of their rational power, Sidgwick allows for the pos-
sibility of calling into the question the authority of morality if at some 
point prudential reasons become stronger;
3.  between the two normative realms there is no relationship of equality (in 
terms of strength) but rather of hierarchy; morality, namely, with regard 
to prudence, always has a overriding strength. Kantians are not the only 
ones who hold this view, but also some utilitarians whose writing are 
inspired by both Kant and Sidgwick such as, for example, Richard Hare 
(cf. 1981: 24); within the framework of this understanding the question 
of the dualism of practical reason shouldn’t even be asked, since any 
possible conflict or lack of coincidence between the prudential and mor-
al demands would be automatically solved for the benefit of the latter.
From what has been said so far it is clear that we are advocating the third 
interpretation of the relationship between the realm of morality and the 
realm of prudence, although we won’t be referring only to the concept of 
overridingness but will try and demonstrate that the difference between 
these two realms lies in different sources of their normativity, which ulti-
mately undermines Sidgwick’s utilitarian presumption that practical rea-
son is entirely maximizing.
The problematic nature of Sidgwick’s theory of dualism originates from his 
emphasis on egoism as a method of ethics,11 which gave the final shape to 
10  The most precious synoptic outlook on this typology of understandings is given 
by Owen McLeod (2001: 269-271).
11  It was already Sidgwick’s student G. E. Moore who headed towards rejecting 
egoism as a theory of ethics (cf. Moore, 1993: 150ff).
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his moral axioms. Since utilitarianism and egoism have in common two 
presumptions – that only happiness is a value in itself and that it should 
be maximized – both theories support the argument that practical reason 
must be a maximizing one. And since both egoism and utilitarianism assert 
the same source of reason (happiness) and the same type of reason (maxi-
mizing, promoting) it cannot be demonstrated that utilitarianism is easier 
to justify than egoism (cf. Hills 2003: 316, 326). Thereof Sidgwick’s moral 
axioms have the following form: there exists a self-evident axiom that one 
ought to maximize one’s own happiness, just as there is a  self-evident axi-
om that one ought to maximize the general happiness (cf. Sidgwick 1981 
[1907]: 386-387; 418; Sidgwick 2000 [1889]: 44). However, he notices 
that from this there seems to follow “an ultimate and fundamental contra-
diction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct” (Sidg-
wick 1981 [1907]: 508).
Three problems emerge from this fundamental contradiction: one prac-
tical and two epistemological (cf. Orsi 2008: 20-21). The practical prob-
lem consists in that neither of the two axioms can’t have a preponderance 
over the other. If this were the case than practical reason would be divid-
ed against itself, which could entail a deadlock in decision-making and 
governing – we simply wouldn’t be able to prescribe to ourselves how we 
ought to act. The first epistemological problem consists in the following: 
even if the two axiomatic maxims can be mutually exclusive, they can’t 
both be intuitive, i.e. self-evident, because “[t]he propositions accepted as 
self-evident must be mutually consistent” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: 341).12 
The second and more far-reaching epistemological problem Sidgwick for-
mulates as follows: “I do not mean that if we gave up the hope of attaining 
a practical solution of this fundamental contradiction, through any legiti-
mately obtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral order of the world, 
it would become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether: but it 
would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalizing it completely” 
(Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: 508).
This more far-reaching, epistemological, inclusive and practical problem 
(that blocks decision-making and thus undermines the concept of auto-
nomy) presents a real challenge to the Kantian ethics. Although there are 
many structural and historical impediments to an adequate comparison 
12  However, if John Mackie’s interpretation of Sidgwick is right, this epistemologi-
cal problem can be discarded: “[W]e are left with the competing apparent intuitions 
that it is rational for a man to seek his own happiness and that it is rational for a man 
to seek the general happiness. These are not in themselves contradictory: A contradic-
tion arises only when we add to these two intuitions the factual statement that what 
best promotes a man’s own happiness does not always coincide with what best promotes 
the general happiness. It is the facts that decide whether the two intuitions come into 
practical conflict or not” (Mackie 1992: 170).
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of Kant’s and Sidgwick’s ethics that shouldn’t prevent us from highlight-
ing some relevant differences. Firstly, contrary to Sidgwick, whose ethics 
ends on a gloomy note with the unsolvable dualism of practical reason, 
Kant’s ethics starts from this dualism and the thesis that solving it is pos-
sible strictly under the condition of a complete rationalization of morality. 
Kant’s optimism consists precisely in this possibility.
If we consistently follow Kant’s dualistic or dichotomic descriptions (duty/
inclination, autonomy/heteronomy, will/desire, anthroponomy/anthropol-
ogy, etc.) we’ll see that he presupposses two different types of values – 
namely, moral value (the intrinsic value of the good will) and prudential 
value (the instrumental value of happiness).13 These types of values have 
various, heterogeneous origins. Certainly, this axiological dualism is associ-
ated with the general duality of reason (a priori, intelligible) and sensibili-
ty (a posteriori, empirical) which underlies the whole of Kant’s philosophy. 
In the realm of practical philosophy the dualism is expressed through two 
types of normativity (morality as a motivational superposition of acting out 
of duty, and prudence as a motivational subposition of acting out of inter-
est or self-love), and two types of imperatives (categorical/hypothetical, 
reason-based/materially determined reasons for action). One could say 
that morality understood as a type of normativity is supernormative, while 
prudence is subnormative. Moral value is an anthroponomically-based un-
conditioned good (of a volitive origin in reason), while prudential value 
is anthropologically-based, conditioned good (of empirical, pathological 
origin) (cf. Kant 1996: 534; Bader 2015: 175). Although Kant admits that 
happiness is a necessary demand of every rational but needy being (cf. Kant 
1996: 159), the material conditionality of the value of happiness14 demon-
strates how prudence, understood as a subnormative source of demands 
for happiness, can be overcame when conflicted with duty understood as 
supernormativity, as moral action based on a priori reasons. 
It’s precisely Sidgwick ahierarchical understanding of these two types of 
values which prevents their satisfactory ordering and assessment. We al-
ready know the outcome: morality and prudence can produce conflicting 
demands, if left without the instance that would resolve the conflict and 
privilege one over the other. Practical reason is left in an irresolvable con-
flict whenever morality and prudence demand different action, threatening 
thus to undermine the coherence of practical reason (Bader 2015: 177), 
wherefore, according to Sidgwick’s famous metaphor, “Cosmos of Duty is 
thus really reduced to a Chaos” (Sidgwick 1874: 473).
13  In the description that follows we mostly pursue and repeat the brilliant inter-
pretation of Ralf M. Bader (2015).
14  Which is “based on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which can never be 
assumed to be universally directed to the same objects” (Kant 1996: 159).
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Kant’s treatment of the dualism of practical reason enables us to overcome 
this threat. According to him, it is precisely the conditionality of happiness 
(interest) which allows us to avoid the conflict between morality and pru-
dence, hence the situations in which practical reason is faced with incom-
patible demands. The instrumental demands of prudence, in order to be 
allowed, must be compatible with the good will as an intrinsic value. Ralf 
Bader illustrates this quite convincingly in his important essay:
“When the action that makes one happy is impermissible, the condition of 
the value of happiness would be undermined by performing this  action. 
Though happiness results from the action, no value is thereby realized. 
Since the action does not produce anything of prudential value, there is 
no prudential reason to perform it. That is, given that the normative force 
attaching to hypothetical imperatives derives from the value of the end 
that is to be realized, it follows that if the condition of the value of the end 
fails to be satisfied, then no value will result from the realization of the 
end, which implies that one does not have any reason to take the means. 
Because the value of happiness is conditional, the claims of prudence that 
are based on this value will also be conditional. In this way, the claims of 
prudence can be silenced by the requirements of duty” (Bader 2015: 185).
Sidgwick’s doubt about the possibility of a consistent rationalization of mo-
rality (the epistemological problem), and his preference for heteronomy 
over autonomy (the practical problem) – under the guise of rational coer-
cion – means for Kant just another unjustified pretension of a content-based 
ethics. Hence, to choose between Sidwick’s pessimism and Kant’s optimism 
in respect to the solution of the problem of dualism of practical reason may 
just be another false dilemma.
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Aleksandar Dobrijević
Dualizam praktičkog uma i autonomija:  
Sidžvikov pesimizam i Kantov optimizam
Apstrakt
U ovom tekstu postavlja se pitanje šta ako je Imanuel Kant rešio problem dua-
lizma praktičkog uma pre nego što je Henri Sidžvik uopšte stigao da ga formuli-
še? Komparacija između sidžvikovskog i kantovskog pristupa problemu dualizma 
praktičkog uma ovde se pruža tek u opštim crtama, ali autor zaključuje da je i to 
dovoljno kako bi se uvidela prednost Kantovog rešenja tog problema.
Ključne reči: Henri Sidžvik, Imanuel Kant, dualizam praktičkog uma, autonomija, 
pesimizam, optimizam
